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Abandoned or Unattended? 
The Outer Limit of Fourth Amendment 
Protection for Homeless Persons’ Property
by TIM DONALDSON*
Introduction 
In 2017, the Los Angeles Times reported that the City of Los Angeles 
spent $14-million on a citywide effort to address an increase of local 
homelessness and had cleaned up 16,500 homeless encampments since 
2015.1  The city removed 3,000 tons of material, which included over 900 
tons from the city’s downtown district alone.2  In 2018, the Seattle Times
reported that the City of Seattle spent $10.2-million in 2017 to remove 
unauthorized homeless encampments and provide outreach assistance to 
camp residents.3  Between January 2017 and March 2018, Seattle removed 
almost 200 unauthorized encampments.4  Such efforts seem part of an 
endless cycle.  Encampments in Los Angeles often reestablished nearby after 
being cleaned.5  Some areas were repeatedly addressed,6 and Los Angeles 
experienced a sevenfold increase in the number of cleanups between 2015 
       *     City Attorney & Municipal Prosecutor, Walla Walla, Washington, 1996-present; J.D., 
Gonzaga University School of Law, 1987; B.A., Whitman College, 1984.  The author thanks Ben 
Poston and Doug Smith of the L.A. Times, Theresa Walker of the Orange County Register, and 
Jonathan Martin, Scott Greenstone, Vernal Coleman and Vianna Davila of the Seattle Times’
Project Homeless initiative for their commitment to journalism.  “[W]ere it left to me to decide 
whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I 
should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward 
Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787) in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 880 (Literary Classics of the United 
States, Inc. 1984). 
 1.  Ben Poston & Doug Smith, Homeless Cleanups in L.A. Have Surged, Costing Millions.  
What Has Been Gained?, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2017, at A1. 
 2.  Id. at A1, A8–A9. 
 3.  Vianna Davila, Seattle to expand team that oversees homeless-camp removal, SEATTLE
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2018, at B2. 
 4.  Id. at B1. 
 5.  Poston & Smith, supra note 1, at A1. 
 6.  Id. at A1, A8. 
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and 2017.7  Seattle similarly cleared more sites in the first seven months of 
2018 than it did in all of 2017.8
The Ninth Circuit United States Court of Appeals held in Lavan v. City 
of Los Angeles that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable seizures guards against summary seizure and destruction of 
unabandoned personal property belonging to homeless persons.9  The court 
explained that the Fourth Amendment protects against both searches and 
seizures, and a person has a possessory interest in his or her property even if 
that person’s expectation of privacy in the property has been extinguished.10
The Fourth Amendment’s seizure restrictions are triggered “when there is 
some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in 
that property.”11  It therefore protects unabandoned personal property 
momentarily left on a public sidewalk in violation of a city ordinance from 
being unreasonably seized and destroyed.12
The Lavan court remarked that it was not addressing whether a person 
has a “constitutionally-protected property right to leave possessions 
unattended on public sidewalks.”13  Instead, the court stated that the case 
concerned a person’s basic interest in the continued ownership of his or her 
personal possessions, and it held that a homeless person maintains a 
protected property right in the person’s unattended belongings that have not 
been abandoned.14  It admonished that “by collecting and destroying 
[homeless persons’] property on the spot, the City acted unreasonably in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”15
Lavan unfortunately gives little guidance regarding how to distinguish 
abandoned property from merely unattended property.  It was not a central 
issue to the case because Los Angeles sought therein “a broad ruling that it 
may seize and immediately destroy any personal possessions, including 
medications, legal documents, family photographs, and bicycles, that are left 
 7.  Poston & Smith, supra note 1, at A1. 
 8.  Vianna Davila, Seattle increasing removals of homeless encampments, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 22, 2018, at A1 (reporting that Seattle cleared 191 sites in 2017 and 220 sites between the 
beginning of the year and the end July in 2018).  Seattle has also experienced a similar problem of 
camps re-forming after they have been cleared.  See Vernal Coleman, In a New Clash Over Seattle 
Camps, Protesters Try to Block Cleanup of Ravenna Encampment, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 18, 2018, 
at B2. 
 9.  Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1027–31 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 10.  Id. at 1029. 
 11.  Id. at 1027 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). 
 12.  Id. at 1029. 
 13.  Id. at 1031. 
 14.  Id. at 1031–32. 
 15.  Id. at 1030. 
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momentarily unattended. . . .”16  The city did “not deny that it ha[d] a policy 
and practice of seizing and destroying homeless persons’ unabandoned 
possessions.”17  Los Angeles did not challenge any of the factual findings 
made by the district court in support of the ruling that was appealed.18  It also 
did not appeal the scope of the lower court’s injunction which prohibited the 
city from seizing homeless persons’ property “absent an objectively 
reasonable belief that it is abandoned, presents an immediate threat to public 
health or safety, or is evidence of a crime, or contraband. . . .”19  Los Angeles 
instead appealed only the legal standard applied by the district court, and 
there was no need for the appellate court to address at that point in the case 
whether the seized property was abandoned or merely unattended.20
However, the distinction between abandoned property and merely 
unattended property is important.21  As reflected in news reports about 
cleanup efforts, tons of materials often need to be removed.22  It is not always 
obvious whether those materials consist of personal property someone hopes 
to retrieve later or only discarded items and waste.  There is an old saying 
that “[o]ne man’s trash is another man’s treasure.”23  This article reviews the 
differences between abandoned property and merely unattended property 
and proposes guidelines for making determinations during community 
cleanups whether an item may be taken to a landfill or must be preserved for 
potential reclamation by its owner. 
 16.  Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1024 n.1. 
 17.  Id. at 1025.  The City did, however, claim in the underlying proceedings that it reasonably 
believed only abandoned property had been seized.  Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 797 F. Supp. 2d 
1005, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012).  It also renewed that claim upon 
remand.  Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-2874 PSG (AJWx), 2014 WL 12693524, at *4–
6 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2014). 
 18.  Id. at 1024, n.2. 
 19.  Id. at 1024; see generally Lavan, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1020 (district court injunction), aff’d
693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 20.  Id. at 1024–27. 
 21.  See Los Angeles Catholic Worker v. Los Angeles Downtown Indus. District Bus. 
Improvement District, No. CV-14-7344 PSG (AJWx), 2015 WL 13649801, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 
13, 2015); Lavan, 2014 WL 12693524, at *8–9. 
 22.  Theresa Walker, Cleaning up a wasteland of epic proportions, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Mar. 10-11, 2018, at A3 (reporting removal of 404 tons of debris); Poston & Smith, supra note 1, 
at A1 (reporting that Los Angeles had removed 3,000 tons of trash during its cleanup efforts). 
 23.  RICHARD A. SPEARS, MCGRAW-HILL’S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN IDIOMS AND 
PHRASALVERBS 473 (2005); see also Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 (S.D. 
Fla. 1992) (“[A] homeless person’s personal property is generally all he owns; therefore, while it 
may look like ‘junk’ to some people, its value should not be discounted.”), remanded for limited 
purposes, 40 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1994), and directed to undertake settlement discussions, 76 F.3d 
1154 (1996). 
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I.  Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable 
Property Seizures 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. . . .”24  “This text protects two types of expectations, one 
involving ‘searches,’ the other ‘seizures.’”25  Its express mention of “houses, 
papers, and effects” also “reflects its close connection to property. . . .”26
The Fourth Amendment therefore protects against unreasonable trespassory 
governmental interference with private property.27
The Supreme Court commented in United States v. Jacobsen that its 
prior cases had not much discussed the concept of a “seizure” of property, 
and it therefore borrowed a formulation from its arrest cases regarding 
seizure of a person.28  The Jacobsen Court concluded that a “‘seizure’ of 
property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an 
individual’s possessory interests in that property.”29  Two elements must 
therefore converge for the Fourth Amendment to apply: (1) a person must 
have a possessory interest in the property at issue;30 and (2) governmental 
action must interfere with that interest in some meaningful way.31  If a 
seizure has occurred, it is constitutionally tested to determine whether the 
seizure was reasonable.32
The number of homeless persons in Miami, Florida increased 
dramatically between 1984 and 1991, and, due to a shelter shortage, most 
were left with no alternative to living in public areas.33  Arrest records and 
internal police department memoranda indicated that the city adopted a 
policy of driving the homeless persons out of those areas.34  As part of this 
effort, the city had a practice of seizing and destroying personal property 
belonging to homeless persons or forcing them to abandon it upon their 
 24.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 25.  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 26.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012). 
 27.  Id. at 404–11; see also Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61–71 (1992). 
 28.  Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113, n.5. 
 29.  Id. at 113; see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712–13 (1984).  
 30.  See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985). 
 31.  See Karo, 468 U.S. at 712. 
 32.  See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120–22; Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-77RSM, 2017 WL 
4410029, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2017); Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 
1013 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 33.  Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1558 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see also Pottinger 
v. City of Miami, 40 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1994) (remanded for limited purposes); Pottinger v. City 
of Miami, 76 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 1996) (directed to undertake settlement discussions). 
 34.  Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1561, 1566–68. 
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arrests for various municipal violations.35  The seized property consisted of 
bedrolls, blankets, clothing, food, personal identification, and other items 
that reasonably appeared to belong to someone.36  Homeless persons alleged 
that the seizures violated their constitutional rights, and Miami responded 
that those persons’ interest in their property was outweighed by the public’s 
need to keep public areas sanitary.37
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
found in Pottinger v. City of Miami that Miami’s handling of homeless 
persons’ property violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable seizures.38  The court had no difficulty concluding that Miami’s 
seizure and destruction of personal belongings constituted meaningful 
interference.39  The court devoted more attention to the question of whether 
personal property is entitled to constitutional protection when it is kept in a 
public area.40  The court determined, under then-existing Supreme Court 
precedent, that the Fourth Amendment protected only reasonable privacy 
expectations.41  The court concluded that the homeless claimants in Pottinger
had proven a subjective expectation of privacy from the manner in which 
they stored their property in containers and either covered it or placed it 
against a tree or other object.42  The court further decided, for a variety of 
reasons, that society’s code of custom and civility would cause society to 
recognize the reasonableness of that expectation since homeless individuals’ 
personal effects represent perhaps the last trace of privacy they have.43  The 
court rejected Miami’s claims that public concerns overrode individual 
interests, holding that a city’s interest in having clean public areas “is 
outweighed by the more immediate interest of [homeless persons] in not 
having their personal belongings destroyed.”44
The City of Chicago experienced a similar situation as Miami and had 
dozens of homeless persons staying in the Lower Wacker Drive area of the 
city.45  Chicago engaged in a practice of regularly cleaning the area of trash 
 35.  See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1570. 
 36.  Id. at 1559. 
 37.  Id. at 1570. 
 38.  Id. at 1570–73. 
 39.  Id. at 1571. 
 40.  Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1571–73. 
 41.  Id.
 42.  Id. at 1571. 
 43.  Id. at 1571–72; see also Cobine v. City of Eureka, 250 F. Supp. 3d 423, 435 (N.D. Cal. 
2017).
 44.  Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1573. 
 45.  Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96-C-0396, 1996 WL 627614, at *2, ¶ 1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 
1996).
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and debris upon twelve (12) hours advance notice.46  Property not claimed 
or moved at the time of a cleaning could be discarded by city workers, but 
the city would not seize belongings from people who wished to remove 
them.47  The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
rejected the arguments in Love v. City of Chicago that the city should be 
required to do more.48
The court in Love wrote that the city had “an important public health 
responsibility to remove and discard abandoned materials so they don’t 
clutter the public way and endanger the health and safety of either the 
homeless or others passing through” the area.49  It recognized that the Fourth 
Amendment protects reasonable privacy expectations, but wrote that such 
“expectation must be evaluated in light of objective circumstances.”50  The 
court explained that “[r]easonableness remains the ultimate standard for 
determining the constitutionality of a seizure of property[,]”51 and it 
determined that removal of unattended materials during a cleanup, after 
giving advance notice, was reasonable.52  The court commented that a city is 
not an insurer for the property of persons who live on public property and 
attributed some risk of loss to those who leave their belongings unattended.53
It recognized that “[v]ery unsanitary conditions can develop quickly, as a 
result of insects, excrement and the presence of items that are not 
systematically cleaned[,]”54 and the court held that public concerns prevailed 
over private interests even though some people might be deprived of their 
personal property.55
Search and seizure issues surrounding the removal of homeless persons’ 
property have been addressed most frequently by courts in the Ninth Circuit 
of the United States Court.56  This is understandable, because over one-third 
 46.  Love, 1996 WL 627614, at *3–4, ¶¶ 7–12. 
 47.  Id. at *4, ¶¶ 13–19. 
48.  Id. at *4, ¶¶ 20–21. 
 49.  Id. at *6; see also Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96-C-0396, 1998 WL 60804, at *4 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 6, 1998). 
 50.  Love, 1996 WL 627614, at *5. 
 51.  Id.; see also Love, 1998 WL 60804, at *9–10. 
 52.  Love, 1996 WL 627614, at *6. 
 53.  Id. at *5–6; see also Love, 1998 WL 60804, at *6, *12. 
 54.  Love, 1996 WL 627614, at *3, ¶ 8; see also Love, 1998 WL 60804, at *4. 
 55.  Love, 1996 WL 627614, at *6. 
 56.  See, e.g., Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1027–31 (9th Cir. 2012); Cobine 
v. City of Eureka, 250 F. Supp. 3d 423, 434–36 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Watters v. Otter, 955 F. Supp. 
2d 1178, 1189-90 (D. Idaho 2013); Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1234–35 
(E.D. Cal. 2009); Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 863–64 (N.D. Cal. 
1994).
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of the nation’s homeless population resides in the Ninth Circuit.57  The 2018 
Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress reported that 552,830 
people experienced homelessness on a single night in 2018.58  Of those 
homeless persons, 196,124 of them were located in the Ninth Circuit 
(Alaska: 2,016, Arizona: 9,865, California: 129,972, Hawaii: 6,530, Idaho: 
2,012, Montana: 1,405, Nevada: 7,544, Oregon: 14,476, and Washington: 
22,304).59  California had the largest number of homeless persons of any 
state, and Washington had the fifth most.60  In addition, the five states with 
the highest rates of unsheltered homeless persons were all found in the Ninth 
Circuit (California: 68.9% of homeless persons were unsheltered, Oregon, 
61.7%, Nevada: 56.2%, Hawaii: 53.2%, and Washington: 47.6%).61
The United States District Court for the Central District of California 
agreed with Pottinger v. City of Miami’s analysis of the Fourth Amendment 
in Justin v. City of Los Angeles.62  The court in Justin entered a temporary 
restraining order enjoining Los Angeles from “[c]onfiscating the personal 
property of the homeless when it has not been abandoned and destroying it 
without notice. . . .”63  It remarked that the city had not put forth any 
justification for seizing and destroying the personal property of homeless 
persons.64  The court recognized the value homeless persons place on the few 
possessions they have,65 and held that they “have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in their property” that is protected by the Fourth Amendment.66
The Central District expanded upon its analysis in Kincaid v. City of 
Fresno.67  The court in Kincaid wrote that cleanup sweeps conducted by the 
city resulted in more than just “meaningful” interference with the possessory 
rights that homeless persons have to their personal property because the 
 57.  See MEGHAN HENRY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. HOUS. & URB. DEV. OFF. OF CMTY. PLAN. &
DEV., THE 2018 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS 10, 14 (2018) 
(The reported number of 196,124 homeless persons residing in States that comprise the Ninth 
Circuit account for approximately 35.5% of the total reported number of 552,830 homeless persons 
nationwide.). 
 58.  Id. at 10. 
 59.  Id. at 14. 
 60.  Id.
 61.  Id. at 15. 
 62.  Justin v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV-00-12352 LGB (AIJx), 2000 WL 1808426, at *10 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2000). 
 63.  Justin, 2000 WL 1808426, at *13. 
 64.  Id. at *10. 
 65.  Id.
 66.  Id. at *9; see also Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F.Supp.2d 1218, 1234–35 (E.D. Cal. 
2009).
 67.  Kincaid v. City of Fresno, No. 1:06-cv-1445 OWW SMS, 2006 WL 3542732, at *35–37 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2006). 
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city’s disposal of such property was “total and irrevocable.”68  It explained 
that “[a]n officer who comes across an individual’s property in a public area 
may seize it only if Fourth Amendment standards are satisfied—for example, 
if the items are evidence of a crime or are contraband.”69  The Kincaid court 
held that the sweeps were more intrusive than necessary and therefore 
violated such standards.70  It rejected the city’s claim that the sweeps dealt 
only with abandoned property, because the evidence demonstrated that the 
homeless persons in that case did not intend to “abandon their tents, carts, 
clothing, bicycles, personal effects, memorabilia, and other property that 
they need to survive, and no reasonable official could believe this to be the 
case.”71  The court wrote that a city cannot “treat property as abandoned and 
trash just because the owner has not removed it in the time the government 
has allotted.”72
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
indicated in Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco that a person only 
loses his or her expectation of privacy when property is intentionally 
abandoned.73  It concluded that “Fourth Amendment protections therefore 
attach to unattended property[.]”74  The court acknowledged, but did not 
resolve, the city’s contention that “the distinction between abandoned and 
unabandoned property involves a ‘difficult determination[.]’”75  It instead 
concluded that San Francisco’s policies requiring ninety (90) day storage of 
“property of value” collected during cleanup activities alleviated Fourth 
Amendment concerns.76
The development of a framework by lower courts in Justin, Kincaid,
and Joyce culminated in Lavan v. City of Los Angeles.77  In Lavan, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that privacy expectations are irrelevant to the 
 68.  Kincaid, 2006 WL 3542732, at *36; see also Proctor v. District of Columbia, 310 F. Supp. 
3d 107, 114 (D.D.C. 2018); Ellis v. Clark County Dep’t. of Corrections, No. 15-5449 RJD, 2016 
WL 4945286, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2016); Carr v. Oregon Dep’t. of Transportation, No. 
3:13-cv-02218-MO, 2014 WL 3741934, at *3 (D. Or. July 29, 2014). 
 69.  Id. at *35. 
 70.  Id. at *35–7. 
 71.  Id. at *37. 
 72.  Id.
 73.  Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 863 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 74.  Id.
 75.  Id.; see also Smith v. City of Corvallis, No. 6:14-cv-01382-MC, 2016 WL 3193190, at 
*5 (D. Or. June 6, 2016) (holding that the question of whether property is abandoned entails a 
factual inquiry that cannot be summarily resolved if disputed). 
 76.  Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 863–64 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also Acosta v. City of Salinas, No. 
15-cv-05415 NC, 2016 WL 1446781, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2016); Cobine v. City of Eureka, 
250 F. Supp. 3d 423, 434–35 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 77.  Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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question of whether a property seizure is unreasonable.78  Seizures are 
subject to reasonableness requirements without regard to privacy 
expectations because the “Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
interferences in property interests regardless of whether there is an invasion 
of privacy.”79  The Lavan court explained that no more is necessary to trigger 
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement than meaningful 
governmental interference with someone’s possessory right to his or her 
property.80
Post-Lavan decisions have focused primarily upon the reasonableness 
of cleanup procedures.81  In Watters v. Otter, the United States District Court 
for Idaho engaged in a similar analysis as in Kincaid and Lavan that focused 
upon the justification for a seizure, but it reached a different conclusion due 
to distinguishing factual circumstances.82  The court upheld an Idaho statute 
that authorized officials to remove unattended personal property from state 
lands if left by its owner after being cited for unlawful camping.83  Property 
was not however immediately destroyed, and it was instead removed to 
storage for ninety (90) days and disposal was authorized only if the property 
remained unclaimed.84  The court recognized that meaningful interference 
with an individual’s possessory property interests triggers constitutionally 
mandated reasonableness considerations, but it determined that the removal 
and storage of property under the Idaho statute was justified under 
community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment since the 
seizures were made to protect the property.85  The court ruled that the 
specified procedures for removal (requiring officials to post notice when 
removing property belonging to absent owners, to store the property for 
ninety (90) days, and to provide an opportunity for owners to contest the 
seizure) made the statute markedly different from situations where property 
was summarily destroyed.86
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington 
similarly held in Hooper v. Seattle that reasonableness is the touchstone of 
 78.  Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027. 
 79.  Id. at 1028–29 (quoting Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 80.  Id. at 1030; see also Russell v. City and County of Honolulu, No. 13-00475 LEK-RLP, 
2013 WL 6222714, at *15 (D. Haw., Nov. 29, 2013); Johnson v. Board of Police Comm’rs, 351 F. 
Supp.2d. 929, 949 (E.D. Mo. 2004). 
 81.  See, e.g., Proctor v. District of Columbia, 310 F. Supp. 3d 107, 114–16 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 82.  Watters v. Otter, 955 F. Supp.2d 1178, 1189–90 (D. Idaho 2013). 
 83.  Id. at 1183, 1188–90.  
 84.  Id. at 1188–89. 
 85.  Id. at 1189. 
 86.  Watters, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 1188–89; see also Cobine v. City of Eureka, No. C 16-02239 
JSW, 2016 WL 1730084, at *4–5 (May 2, 2016). 
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Fourth Amendment analysis.87  It explained that reasonableness is assessed 
by balancing the nature and quality of an intrusion upon an individual’s 
possessory interests against the importance of the governmental interests 
used to justify the intrusion.88  The court agreed with Seattle that Lavan did 
not prevent the city from lawfully seizing and detaining property or 
removing hazardous debris and trash during cleanup efforts as long as it 
provided notice beforehand and a reasonable opportunity for retrieval of 
property that had been removed.89  It stressed that “[t]he Fourth Amendment 
prohibits ‘unreasonable’ seizures of property.”90
The cleanup policy at issue in Hooper differentiated between “personal 
property” and “hazardous items.”91  “Personal property” was defined as “an 
item that: is reasonably recognizable as belonging to a person; has apparent 
utility in its present condition and circumstances; and is not hazardous.”92
“Hazardous items” were defined in part as items that reasonably appear “to 
pose a health or safety risk to members of the public or to City employees or 
to other authorized personnel.”93  The rules advised that any dispute 
regarding characterization of an item was to be resolved in favor of treating 
the item as personal property.94  City policies provided that notice be given 
prior to removal of an encampment unless it created an obstruction or an 
immediate hazard.95  In addition, city procedures allowed for recovery of 
 87.  Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-77RSM, 2017 WL 4410029, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 
4, 2017); Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-77RSM, 2017 WL 591112, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 
14, 2017); see also Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96-C-0396, 1998 WL 60804, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 6, 1998). 
 88.  Hooper, 2017 WL 4410029, at *9; Hooper, 2017 WL 591112, at *6. 
 89.  See Hooper, 2017 WL 591112, at *6. 
 90.  Hooper, 2017 WL 4410029, at *9; see generally Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
222 (1960) (“It must always be remembered that what the Constitution forbids is not all searches 
and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.”).  
 91.  Id. at *9. 
 92.  Id.
 93.  Id.
 94.  Id.; see generally Declaration of Breanne Schuster in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Ex. C, City of Seattle Dept. of Finance and Administrative Services Rules 
Regarding: Unauthorized Camping on City Properties Enforcement Procedures; and Removal of 
Unauthorized Property, at 2, § 3.5 [hereinafter Declaration Ex. C], Ex. D, City of Seattle Multi-
Departmental Administrative Rules Regarding: Operating Hours for City Properties; Unauthorized 
Camping on City Properties; Enforcement Procedures; and Removal of Unauthorized Property, at 
6, § 3.15 [hereinafter Declaration Ex. D], Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM (W.D. 
Wash. June 14, 2017). 
 95.  See Declaration Ex. C, supra note 94 at 2–3, § 4 (re: removal of obstructions and hazards), 
4, § 6 (re: encampment removal and notice requirements).  
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personal property and summary disposal only of garbage, debris, waste, 
hazardous items, and other like material.96
The court in Hooper rejected an argument that the cleanup policy’s 
definitions for “personal property” and “hazardous materials” left too much 
discretion to governmental officials.97  It wrote, “[a]lthough the taking and 
destroying of property is considered a ‘seizure,’ this act is only unlawful if a 
party can demonstrate unreasonableness.”98  The court therefore concluded 
that the definitions were sufficient unless an aggrieved party could 
demonstrate that they would result in unreasonable seizures.99  It found that 
the city’s reasons for refusing to store certain items, such as those that were 
wet, muddy, or near drug paraphernalia or urine, were backed by 
scientifically supported concerns.100  The court commented that the degree 
of discretion left to officials did “not by itself demonstrate that exercise of 
that discretion is unreasonable.”101
In Los Angeles Catholic Worker v. Los Angeles Downtown Industrial 
District Business Improvement District, the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California held that homeless persons need not 
demonstrate a right to leave property unattended on public rights-of-way to 
be protected by the Fourth Amendment.102  It explained that municipal 
prohibitions against leaving personal property on a parkway or sidewalk 
must satisfy Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements.103  The court 
ruled that a seizure of unabandoned property may be unreasonable even if 
the government stores, rather than destroys, the property.104
The parties in Los Angeles Catholic Worker later settled, and the court 
entered a stipulated judgment that described the circumstances under which 
 96.  See Declaration Ex. C, supra note 94, at 5–7, § 9–12 (re: encampment site cleanup, post-
removal notice, and storage and recovery of personal property); Declaration Ex. D, supra note 94, 
at 15, § 8.2.1 (re: summary removal and disposal). 
 97.  Hooper, 2017 WL 4410029, at *9–10.  
 98.  Id. at *9. 
 99.  Id.
 100.  Id. at *10. 
 101.  Id. at *9. 
 102.  Los Angeles Catholic Worker v. Los Angeles Downtown Industrial District Bus. 
Improvement District, No. CV-14-7344 PSG (AJWx), 2015 WL 13649801, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 
13, 2015). 
 103.  Id. at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2015). 
 104.  Los Angeles Catholic Worker, 2015 WL 13649801, at *4.  But see Cobine v. City of 
Eureka, 250 F. Supp. 3d 423, 434–35 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Acosta v. City of Salinas, No. 15-cv-05415 
NC, 2016 WL 1446781, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2016); Watters v. Otter, 955 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 
1188–90 (D. Idaho 2013); Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 863–64 
(N.D. Cal. 1994). 
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city officials could remove items from sidewalks and other public places.105
The judgment adopted a reasonableness test to determine whether property 
is abandoned.106  Before determining whether property is abandoned, 
officials must ask any people who are nearby if they can identify the owner 
of the property.107  If the owner of the property is unknown and the property 
is not packed up, officials may affix a notice to it that the property will be 
deemed abandoned and removed if it has not been moved to a new location 
within twenty-four (24) hours after the property has been posted.108  If the 
property is packed up, officials may, after first observing it unattended in the 
same location for twenty-four (24) hours, affix a notice to it that the property 
will be deemed abandoned and removed if the property has not been moved 
to a new location within twenty-four (24) hours after it has been posted.109
After posting property for the specified period, officials may proceed 
with removal of the property if “they have an objectively reasonable belief” 
that it is abandoned.110  “Abandoned property is defined as property where 
there is no objectively reasonable belief that the property belongs to a 
person.”111  Property cannot be deemed abandoned if (1) its owner is present, 
(2) the property has been moved at least twenty feet (20’) since it was tagged 
with a removal notice, or (3) the property is packed up and placed in such a 
manner to allow thirty-six inches (36”) of travel clearance and has either 
been posted with a sign indicating that it is not abandoned or identified by 
someone near the property as belonging to a specific individual.112
Property owners, homeless persons, and advocates have all expressed 
dissatisfaction with the implementation of cleanup policies adopted in the 
wake of Lavan v. City of Los Angeles.113  Los Angeles has established a 
process whereby cleanup requests may be made either by telephone call or a 
smart phone app.114  Cleanups are preceded by seventy-two (72) hours 
advance notice posted in an affected area, and homeless persons are given 
60-gallon bags to fill with their belongings on cleanup days.115  In addition, 
 105.  Stipulated Judgment, Los Angeles Catholic Worker v. Los Angeles Downtown Industrial 
District Bus. Improvement District, No. CV-14-7344 PSG (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2017). 
 106.  Id. at 4–6, ¶I(2)(f)–(g). 
 107.  Id. at 5, ¶I(2)(g)(i). 
108. Id. at 6, ¶I(2)(g)(ii). 
 109.  Id. at 6, ¶I(2)(g)(iii). 
 110.  Id. at 4, ¶I(2)(f). 
 111.  Id. at 4, ¶I(2)(f)(i). 
 112.  Id. at 4–5, ¶I(2)(f)(ii). 
 113.  See Vernal Coleman, Protestors Attempt to Block Cleanup of Homeless Camp Near U-
Village, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 18, 2018, at B1–B2; Poston & Smith, supra note 1, at A8; see 
generally Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1027–33 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 114.  Poston & Smith, supra note 1, at A9. 
 115.  Id.
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personal property may be tagged and stored by the city for ninety (90) days 
if someone has too much property to fit in a bag.116  Trash and other 
hazardous items are removed from a site by city workers, and the area is 
thereafter spayed with disinfectant.117  Despite these efforts, some homeless 
still claim that city workers really don’t clean and “just take people’s 
stuff.”118  In addition, residents and business owners desire a more permanent 
solution,119 and complain that city efforts have been futile since people 
“come right back” after an area has been cleaned.120
Seattle residents complained in early 2018 that the city’s cleanup 
process had become less responsive.121  Later that year, the city increased the 
number of encampment sites cleared without advance notice under the 
provisions of its policy allowing immediate removal of obstructions and 
hazards.122  The increase came amid political pressure to address the city’s 
homeless encampment situation.123  However, advocates for the homeless 
criticized the camp clearing efforts for just moving people around without 
addressing the real issues underlying homelessness.124
City officials in both Los Angeles and Seattle nevertheless contend that 
the cleanup activities are important.125  The mayor’s office asserts that 
Seattle’s efforts preserve public health and safety by removing obstructions 
and hazards, “to ensure sidewalks, roadways, and public spaces remain safe 
and open for all residents, businesses and visitors to utilize.”126  Officials in 
Los Angeles point out that the situation there would be much worse without 
its cleanup activities.127  The president of its public works board asks that 
those critical of the city’s endeavors consider,”[w]ho might have ended up 
in an unsafe situation because of hazardous material or where someone is 
forced to walk into the street?”128
 116.  Poston & Smith, supra note 1, at A9. 
 117.  Id.
 118.  Id. at A8. 
 119.  Id. at A1–A8. 
 120.  Id. at A8. 
 121.  Vianna Davila, As Shelter Beds Fill Up, Cleanup of Homeless Camps Slows, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2018, at A11. 
 122.  Davila, supra note 8, at A1, A6. 
 123.  Id. at A6. 
 124.  Id.
 125.  Id.; Poston & Smith, supra note 1, at A8. 
 126.  Davila, supra note 8, at A6. 
 127.  Poston & Smith, supra note 1, at A8. 
 128.  Id.
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II.  Abandonment Under the Fourth Amendment 
In Hester v. United States, the Supreme Court indicated that there is no 
seizure in a legal sense when property is examined after it has been 
abandoned.129  However, the modern origin of the Court’s abandonment 
doctrine is Abel v. United States130 which was later popularized by the Tom 
Hanks’ movie Bridge of Spies.131  “The Abel case does not teach that the 
defendant has no standing to object to a search and seizure of abandoned 
property, but that ‘[t]here can be nothing unlawful in the Government’s 
appropriation of such abandoned property.’”132
Rudolf Abel was arrested on an administrative immigration warrant at 
a hotel where he had been staying.133  Following his arrest, Abel was told to 
pack his belongings and he agreed to check out of the hotel.134  While 
packing, Abel deliberately left some items on a window sill and put others 
in a wastepaper basket.135  FBI agents later searched the hotel room without 
a warrant and found a hollow pencil containing microfilm and a wood block 
containing a cipher pad in the wastepaper basket.136  The Supreme Court 
upheld the seizure of the items found in the wastepaper basket, because Abel 
had “thrown them away” and thereby abandoned them.137  The Court wrote 
that those items were “bona vacantia” as far as Abel was concerned (i.e., 
“[v]acant, unclaimed, or stray goods.  Those things in which nobody claims 
a property, and which belonged, under the common law, to the 
finder. . . .”).138
 129.  Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1964); accord California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
621, 628–29 (1991). 
 130.  Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). 
 131.  See e.g. United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing Abel, 362 
U.S. at 241 as the source of the abandonment rule); United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 902 (9th 
Cir. 1972) (same). 
 132.  Wilson, 472 F.2d at 902 (quoting Abel, 362 U.S. at 241); but see United States v. Jackson, 
544 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976) (framing the issue of abandonment as a question of standing). 
 133.  Abel, 362 U.S. at 222–23. 
 134.  Id. at 224. 
 135.  Id.
 136.  Id. at 225. 
 137.  Id. at 241. 
 138.  Id. at 241; Bona Vacantia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (4th ed. 1968); see 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 288, ch. 8 (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1765) (describing bona vacantia items as “goods in which no one else can claim 
a property.”); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
409–10, ch. 27 (1766). 
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Circuit court cases have held Fourth Amendment abandonment differs 
from abandonment under property law.139  They explain that analysis under 
the Fourth Amendment, “examines the individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy, not his property interest in the item.”140  The principle underlying 
these cases “is that upon abandonment, the party loses a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the property and thereby disclaims any concern 
about whether the property or its contents remain private.”141  Consequently, 
the cases do not really address abandonment of possessory interests because 
“what is abandoned is not necessarily the [person’s] property, but his 
reasonable expectation of privacy therein.”142
Abandonment issues addressed in modern circuit court search and 
seizure cases are framed by Katz v. United States.143  In Katz, the Supreme 
Court wrote, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”144  It 
acknowledged that the Amendment was thought at one time to apply only to 
searches and seizures of tangible property but explained that the “premise 
that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize 
has been discredited.”145  The Court explained that the proper focus of 
inquiry is an individual’s expectation of privacy.146  It held, “[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not 
subject to Fourth Amendment protection. . . .  But what he seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”147
Justice Harlan wrote in his Katz concurrence that the scope of the 
protection provided by the Fourth Amendment “requires reference to 
‘place.’”148  He explained that a home is generally a place where one expects 
privacy, but that objects, activities, and statements exposed to plain view of 
 139.  E.g., United States v. Fulani, 368 F.3d 351, 354 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Hoey, 
983 F.2d 890, 892–93 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 
1990); United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Edwards, 441 
F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 140.  Fulani, 368 F.3d at 354; see also United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 902–03 (9th Cir. 
1972).
 141.  United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 142.  City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365, 371 (Minn. 1975); see also United States v. 
Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 143.  See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)); United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(same).
 144.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 145.  Id. at 353 (1967) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1966)). 
 146.  See id. at 350–52. 
 147.  Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted). 
 148.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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outsiders are not protected since they have not been kept private.149  On the 
other hand, some activities, like calls from a telephone booth, may occur in 
a place open to the public, but are protected when a person takes reasonable 
steps to secure temporary privacy.150  In Justice Harlan’s opinion, Fourth 
Amendment protection depended upon a two part analysis: “first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”151  Justice Harlan’s formulation is now the prevailing view.152
In United States v Jones, the Supreme Court’s decision signaled a 
departure from Katz and the resurrection of a property rights-based approach 
to the Fourth Amendment.153  There, the Court found that installation of a 
global-positioning-system (GPS) tracking device to a vehicle constituted a 
search.154  It rejected an argument made by the government that no search 
had occurred since the device was attached to the exterior of the vehicle and 
tracked only the movements on public roads.155  The Court explained that 
Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall solely upon privacy 
expectations, and a physical intrusion of private property may constitute a 
search if it is done for the purpose of finding something or obtaining 
information.156  It held that real and personal property law concepts are still 
relevant in the post-Katz environment, and wrote, “Katz did not narrow the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope.”157 Katz remains part of the analysis, but Jones
makes clear that it does not provide the exclusive test for Fourth Amendment 
violations.158
Argument may be made in light of the 2012 Jones decision that property 
law principles should be used to analyze abandonment issues in situations 
involving seizures.159  The Fourth Amendment accommodates both a privacy 
expectation test and a property rights test tied to common law trespass 
 149.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 150.  Id.
 151.  Id.
 152.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 31-35 (2001); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1571 (S.D. Fla. 1992), 
remanded for limited purposes, 40 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir.1994), and directed to undertake settlement 
discussions, 76 F.3d 1154 (1996). 
 153.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–11 (2012). 
 154.  Id. at 404. 
 155.  Id. at 406–08. 
 156.  Id. at 408, n.5. 
 157.  Id. at 408. 
 158.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 411. 
 159.  See id. at 404–11. 
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concepts.160  The privacy expectation test does not squarely address whether 
a person has a property right to an item.161  The Fourth Amendment protects 
a person’s possessory interests in property apart from whatever privacy 
interest the person may have in it.162  It could therefore be argued that a 
privacy expectation test does not adequately evaluate whether possessory 
rights to property have been lost. 
Pre-Katz search and seizure cases held that abandonment depended 
upon a factual determination regarding the combined acts and intent of the 
person who purportedly abandoned his or her property.163  In Friedman v. 
United States, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote that abandonment 
questions were twofold: “How did the person who was supposed to have 
abandoned the property act, that is, what did he do, and, second, what was 
his intention?”164  The Virginia Supreme Court further explained in Hawley 
v. Virginia that intent was determined “from what the actor said and did; 
intent, though subjective, is determined from the objective facts at hand.”165
Those objective facts could consist of acts or words known to authorities.166
For example, a change of residence indicated abandonment of a former 
residence.167  A disclaimer of ownership also signaled abandonment.168
Abandonment could not however be the result of unlawful pressure to 
discard an item.169  The pre-Katz abandonment test therefore looked much 
like the test utilized by property law.170
 160.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–14 (2018); Byrd v. United States, 138 
S.Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018). 
 161.  See United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 666 (6th Cir. 1986); City of St. Paul v. 
Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365, 371 (Minn. 1975). 
 162.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 543 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 163.  Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1965); New Jersey v. Bailey, 235 
A.2d 214, 216 (N.J. Super. 1967); People v. Chitty, 243 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963); 
see also United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632, 634 (3rd Cir. 1962) (stating that abandonment is 
“largely a question of intent” with citation to United States v. Wheeler, 161 F. Supp. 193, 198 
(W.D. Ark. 1958) which further explained that “intentions of men generally have to be determined 
by their acts.  Intention to abandon, coupled with a surrender of possession, or what is equivalent 
thereto, constitutes legal abandonment”) (quoting Kunst v. Mabie, 77 S.E. 987, 990 (W. Va. 1913). 
 164.  Friedman, 347 F.2d at 704. 
 165.  Hawley v. Virginia, 144 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Va. 1965). 
 166.  See Bailey, 235 A.2d at 216–17. 
 167.  Argo v. United States, 378 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1967); see also Feguer v. United States, 
302 F.2d 214, 249 (8th Cir. 1962) (departure from hotel room). 
 168.  See Elledge v. United States, 359 F.2d 404, 405 (9th Cir. 1966); Bailey, 235 A.2d at 216; 
Burton v. United States, 272 F.2d 473, 476–77 (9th Cir. 1959). 
 169.  United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160, 164-65 (D. Mass. 1960); see also Work v. United 
States, 243 F.2d 660, 662–63 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
 170.  See, e.g., Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704–05 (8th Cir. 1965) (relying upon 
property law cases). 
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In Katsaris v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
surveyed cases across the nation involving abandonment in the strict 
property right sense.171  It concluded that guidance was limited, cases were 
few and old, and that the property law concept of abandonment has “a 
generally accepted and a well defined and technical meaning.”172  It 
explained that abandonment under property law requires “a voluntary 
intention to abandon, or evidence from which such intention may be 
presumed.”173  In addition, “[i]t is essential that the owner act without 
coercion or pressure.”174  The Katsaris court further explained that the 
property law doctrine of abandonment “has no application unless there is a 
total desertion by the owner without being pressed by any necessity, duty or 
utility to himself, but simply because he no longer desires to possess the thing 
and willingly abandons it to whoever wishes to possess it.”175  Under 
property law, “[a]bandonment is always voluntary and involves a positive 
intention to part with ownership.”176  It is a combination of a visible act and 
voluntary intent.177
A test based solely upon an analysis of property rights may however be 
inadequate for constitutional analysis because such rights don’t 
independently control the government’s ability to search and seize.178
Property law informs Fourth Amendment analysis by measuring the 
legitimacy of interests thereby protected, but is not by itself determinative of 
the scope of constitutional requirements.179  On the same day Abel v. United 
States was decided, the Supreme Court was persuaded in Jones v. United 
States:
[T]hat it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law 
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined 
by the common law in evolving the body of private property law 
 171.  Katsaris v. United States, 684 F.2d 758, 761-63 (1982). 
 172.  Id.
 173.  Id. at 762 (quoting The No. 105, Belcher Oil Co. v. Griffin, 97 F.2d 425, 426 (5th Cir. 
1938)).
 174.  Id.
 175.  Id.
 176.  Id.
 177.  Id; see generally 1 AM. JUR. 2d Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 8 (2018). 
 178.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
304–07 (1966). 
 179.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
183–84 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122, 122 n.22 (1984); Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 142–44, 163 n.12 (1978); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2213 
(2018).
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which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been 
shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.180
An abandonment test based solely on property law principles might not 
sufficiently protect either the rights of homeless persons or the public 
interest.  The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures applies to the States through the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.181  The Supreme Court has explained in the 
context of due process that “[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created 
by the Constitution.  Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined 
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source 
such as state law. . . .”182  The dimensions of a property law based test would 
arguably fall under the aegis of each State to decide with little constitutional 
impediment.183  It could therefore be defined in a manner that avoids Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny altogether, because “Fourth Amendment protection 
 180.  Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960); see also United States v. Salvucci, 448 
U.S. 83, 91–93 (1980); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); United States v. 
Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 902–03 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 181.  Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–60 (1961). 
 182.  Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 
467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (restating with respect to the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
“the basic axiom that ‘property interests . . . are not created by the Constitution.  Rather, they are 
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law.’”) (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 
449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)); Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2012).  
The Supreme Court has similarly indicated that the Fourth Amendment protects interests having a 
“source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal 
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”  United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 (2012) (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)); see also
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12 (1978); Cooper v. Gray, No. CV 12-208 TUC DCB, 
2015 WL 13119400, at *8 (D. Az. Feb. 13, 2015). 
 183.  Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 435–36 (1951) (“As a broad principle of 
jurisprudence rather than as a result of the evolution of legal rules, it is clear that a state, subject to 
constitutional limitations, may use its legislative power to dispose of property within its reach, 
belonging to unknown persons.”); see also Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 497 (1993) 
(“States as sovereigns may take custody of or assume title to abandoned personal property as bona 
vacantia, a process commonly (though somewhat erroneously) called escheat.”); Anderson 
National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 240 (1944) (“At common law, abandoned personal 
property was not the subject of escheat, but was subject only to the right of appropriation by the 
sovereign as bona vacantia. . . .  Like rights of appropriation, except so far as limited by state law 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, exist in the several states of the United States.”) (citation omitted); 
cf. Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 285–90 (1923) (upholding a State escheat 
statute against constitutional challenge). 
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does not extend to abandoned property.”184  While this might logically follow 
from Abel v. United States,185 it would create considerable uncertainty and 
insecurity for transient homeless persons unfamiliar with local laws. 
In addition, important public policy issues are not addressed by the 
traditional abandonment test used in the property law setting.  The court in 
Lavan did not address whether a person has a right to leave his or her 
belongings on a public sidewalk.186  It is however a core question of public 
concern, because sidewalks are provided for everyone, and other users are 
impacted when individuals unilaterally devote portions of them to prolonged 
personal use.187  For example, shop owners have a legitimate interest in 
removal of personal property from the sidewalks in front of their businesses 
that discourages customers from entering, and they are entitled to know what 
can and cannot be done when they encounter those situations.188  Property 
law abandonment principles do not answer such questions or delve into the 
propriety of particular private uses of public property and rights-of-way or 
issues regarding when, where, and how long persons may reasonably leave 
personal property unattended in public places.189
III.  Proposed Abandonment Test 
A modified version of Justice Harlan’s Katz rubric would better address 
competing private and public interests than a test based solely on property 
law principles; to wit: (1) has someone “exhibited an actual (subjective)” 
possessory interest in property left unattended, and (2) is that interest “one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”190  The original Katz
 184.  United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. 
Thomas, 451 F.3d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1990); 
Olivera v. City of Modesto, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1172 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 
 185.  See United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1993) (asserting that abandonment 
eliminates further Fourth Amendment considerations); United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 902 
(9th Cir. 1972) (same); United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 751–53 (5th Cir. 1971) (same); 
see generally Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960); Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of 
Abandonment in the Law of Search and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF.
L. REV. 399, 400–01 (1971). 
 186.  Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 187.  See, e.g., John A. Tolman & Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 488, 489–90 (Ill. 1909). 
 188.  An abutting property owner may own the land underlying a sidewalk and street subject 
only to the public’s right of passage.  E.g. Puget S. Alumni Kappa Sig. v. Seattle, 422 P.2d 799, 
802 (Wash. 1967).  Such owner may also have the right to enjoin unlawful uses, and the scope and 
extent of the public’s easement might therefore limit the purposes for which a sidewalk or street 
may be used.  See, e.g., Motoramp Garage Co. v. City of Tacoma, 241 P. 16, 16–18 (Wash. 1925). 
 189.  Cf. Kincaid v. City of Fresno, No. 1:06-cv-1445 OWW SMS, 2006 WL 3542732, at *37 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2006) (limiting the scope of a property law inquiry to owner intent). 
 190.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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formulation has detractors.191  It can arguably be somewhat “circular, and 
hence subjective and unpredictable.”192  Those criticisms do not, however, 
diminish its value as an analytical tool to bilaterally evaluate issues involving 
an interplay between personal exigencies and societal norms.193  For 
example, a person may sincerely intend to go back to a campsite and 
belongings that are deserted during periods of inclement weather,  but the 
plausibility of any purported belief that forsaken property will realistically 
await the person’s return undisturbed diminishes with the passage of time.194
A day might be considered reasonable, but weeks or months strain 
reasonableness despite someone’s subjective intent,195 especially if the 
unattended property interferes with other uses of the public property or right-
of-way on which it sits.  An abandonment test based solely on property law 
would focus only on owner intentions,196  whereas a Katz-based test would 
also consider the reasonableness of the owner’s expectations.197
Following remand in Lavan, Los Angeles contended that the unattended 
property destroyed by city was indeed abandoned.198  The United States 
District Court for the Central District of California referenced the 
abandonment test developed under the Katz framework and indicated that 
the inquiry focused “on whether, ‘through words, acts or other objective 
indications, a person has relinquished a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the property at the time of the search or seizure.’”199  The court commented 
that “a determination is ‘to be made in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, and two important factors are denial of ownership and 
physical relinquishment of the property.’”200  The modification proposed in 
 191.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2236–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Minnesota 
v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97–98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 192.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 193.  See, e.g., Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96-C-0396, 1996 WL 627614, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 25, 1996); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1571–73 (S.D. Fla. 1992), remanded 
for limited purposes, 40 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir.1994), and directed to undertake settlement 
discussions, 76 F.3d 1154 (1996). 
 194.  Cf. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (“It is common knowledge that 
plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, 
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”). 
 195.  See Proctor v. District of Columbia, 310 F. Supp. 3d 107, 114–15 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 196.  See Katsaris v. United States, 684 F.2d 758, 761–62 (1982). 
 197.  See, e.g., United States v. Alden, 576 F.2d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 1978); see also United States 
v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3rd Cir. 1981). 
 198.  Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-2874, 2014 WL 12693524, at *4–6 (C.D. Cal. 
July 24, 2014). 
 199.  Id. at *8, (quoting United States v. Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986)); accord
Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d on other grounds
693 F.3d 1022, 1026–31 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 200.  Id. at *8 (quoting Nordling, 804 F.2d at 1469); accord Lavan, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. 
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this article would redirect the analysis to whether a reasonable expectation 
of an ongoing possessory interest has been relinquished as opposed to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, but the words, acts, or other objective 
indications examined to make a determination would remain much the same. 
The point of analysis under a modified test would be slightly different 
than a privacy expectation test, but the method of inquiry should not 
change.201  In summary, “[a]bandonment is primarily a question of intent, 
and intent may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective 
facts. . . .  All relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged 
abandonment should be considered.”202  There is a subjective component, 
but there must be more than just subjective intent, because any expectation 
must be objectively reasonable.203  Therefore, an abandonment 
“determination is to be made by objective standards.”204  In United States v. 
Basinski, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals more fully explained: 
To demonstrate abandonment, the government must establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s voluntary 
words or conduct would lead a reasonable person in the searching 
officer’s position to believe that the defendant relinquished his 
property interests in the item searched or seized. . . .  Because this 
is an objective test, it does not matter whether the defendant 
harbors a desire to later reclaim an item; we look solely to the 
external manifestations of his intent as judged by a reasonable 
person possessing the same knowledge available to the 
government agents . . . .  We look at the totality of the 
 201.  The district court in Lavan described the test as being a question of whether a person had 
relinquished a privacy expectation in property that has been seized, but it applied the test more like 
the modified Katz test proposed in this article by considering “under the totality of circumstances, 
whether any other objective facts indicate[d] that the property in question appeared be abandoned 
at the time of seizure.”  Lavan, 2014 WL 12693524, at *8.  Such application seems to follow from 
the Ninth Circuit’s earlier ruling in the case that Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable seizures are not dependent on privacy expectations.  Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027–29. 
 202.  United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973) (citation omitted); accord
Nordling, 804 F.2d at 1469; Lavan, 2014 WL 12693524, at *8; Lavan, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1013, 
aff’d 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 203.  United States v. Austin, 66 F.3d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. 
Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 837, 837 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 204.  United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983); accord United States v. 
Fulani, 368 F.3d 351, 354 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806, 810–11 (7th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Kendall, 
655 F.2d 199, 200–02 (9th Cir. 1981); Proctor v. District of Columbia, 310 F. Supp. 3d 107, 114 
(D. D.C. 2018). 
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circumstances, but pay particular attention to explicit denials of 
ownership and to any physical relinquishment of the property.205
Under a modified Katz-based abandonment test, officials would 
evaluate the totality of the circumstances during a cleanup action to 
determine if objective manifestations (i.e., words, acts or other objective 
indications) would lead a reasonable person in the official’s position to 
conclude that possessory interests in the property targeted for removal have 
been relinquished.206  The following guidelines are suggested: 
1. Property is not abandoned when its owner is present; unless it has 
been physically relinquished or affirmatively disclaimed.207
2. Property left in someone else’s care is not abandoned.208
3. Garbage and debris left in a public area is abandoned.209
4. Property deserted beyond a reasonable period of time, when 
considering the totality of the circumstances, is abandoned.210
These guidelines cannot, however, be blindly applied.  “Whether there 
has been an abandonment, of course, depends upon all relevant 
circumstances existing at the time.”211
Recurring considerations have emerged from property removal cases 
involving homeless persons to evaluate whether someone has demonstrated 
a possessory interest in unattended property.212  Organized and packed items 
 205.  Basinski, 226 F.3d at 836–37 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Quintana-
Grijalva, 332 F. App’x 487, 491 (10th Cir. 2009).  Some courts however hold that abandonment 
“must be established by clear and unequivocal evidence.”  Fulani, 368 F.3d at 354; see also
Friedman, 347 F.2d at 704. 
 206.  See Proctor, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 114; Lavan, 2014 WL 12693524, at *8–9; see generally
Basinski, 226 F.3d at 836–37. 
 207.  See United States v. Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466, 1469–70 (9th Cir. 1986) (disclaimer); see 
also United States v. Liu, 180 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 1999) (physical relinquishment). 
 208.  United States v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 2003) (“a person does not abandon 
his property merely because he gives it to someone else to store”); see also Basinski, 226 F.3d at 
837–38. 
 209.  E.g., United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1112–14 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Alden, 576 F.2d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 210.  See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 197 F.3d 1198, 1200–01 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 211.  United States v. Manning, 440 F.2d 1105, 1111 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 212.  Compare Stipulated Judgment at 4-6, ¶I(2)(f)–(g), Los Angeles Catholic Worker v. Los 
Angeles Downtown Industrial District Business Improvement District, No. CV-14-7344 PSG 
(AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2017) (stipulated factors used to determine if a seizure is reasonable) 
with Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1571 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (reviewing factual 
circumstances manifesting an expectation of privacy), remanded for limited purposes, 40 F.3d 1155 
(11th Cir.1994), and directed to undertake settlement discussions, 76 F.3d 1154 (1996). 
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show ownership by their arrangement.213  Haphazardly placed materials 
might reasonably be considered abandoned.214  The characteristics of the 
items are also relevant.215  Blankets, clothing, food, and identification 
indicate an ownership interest, while refuse and scattered materials 
demonstrate abandonment.216  In addition, the manner in which items are 
placed or arranged is pertinent.217  Items placed out of the way are more 
likely owned than abandoned.218  Safekeeping measures are a particularly 
important indicator.219  Property left in the care of others cannot fairly be 
classified as abandoned.220  However, disavowal of ownership may be 
viewed as an act of relinquishment.221  Walking away from property during 
a cleanup effort may indicate abandonment.222  There is also temporal 
element, and the longer an item is left unattended in the same spot, the more 
likely it is abandoned.223  Such considerations would be material under either 
a modified Katz-based test to determine whether someone has displayed a 
possessory interest in unattended property or a property law based test to 
 213.  See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1571; compare Stipulated Judgment at 5, ¶I(2)(g)(ii), Los 
Angeles Catholic Worker (allowing unpacked materials to be immediately posted with a removal 
notice), with Stipulated Judgment at 5, ¶I(2)(g)(iii), Los Angeles Catholic Worker (requiring a 
twenty-four (24) hour observation period before packed materials may be posted). 
 214.  See Lavan, 2014 WL 12693524, at *8. 
 215.  See Kincaid v. City of Fresno, No. 1:06-cv-1445 OWW SMS, 2006 WL 3542732, at *37 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2006); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1571. 
 216.  See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1571 (concluding that “bedrolls, blankets, clothing, toiletry 
items, food, and identification” suggest ownership and are reasonably distinguishable from paper 
refuse and scattered items; Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-77RSM, 2017 WL 4410029, at *9–
10 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2017) (distinguishing between “personal property” and “hazardous 
materials”). 
 217.  See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1571. 
 218.  See Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96-C-0396, 1998 WL 60804, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 
1998)(materials moved to “safe areas” during cleanups are not abandoned); Pottinger, 810 F.Supp. 
at 1571 (items placed against a tree or other object or covered by a pillow or blanket indicate 
ownership); Stipulated Judgment at 4-5, ¶I(2)(f)(ii), Los Angeles Catholic Worker (items stored in 
a manner that preserves an area for public passage cannot be deemed abandoned). 
 219.  See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1571 (recognizing that homeless persons may ask others 
to watch their property while they are away); Stipulated Judgment at 5, ¶I(2)(g)(i), Los Angeles 
Catholic Worker (requiring officials to ask persons who are nearby unattended property if they can 
identify its owner). 
 220.  See Cooper v. Gray, No. CV 12-208 TUC DCB, 2015 WL 13119400, at *8 (D. Az. Feb. 
13, 2015). 
 221.  Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-2874 PSG (AJWx), 2014 WL 12693524, at *9. 
(C.D. Cal. July 24, 2014). 
 222.  See Proctor v. District of Columbia, 310 F. Supp. 3d 107, 114–15 (D. D.C. 2018); Lavan,
2014 WL 12693524, at *9; Love, 1998 WL 60804, at *10. 
 223.  See Proctor, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 114–15; Stipulated Judgment at 6, ¶I(2)(g)(iii), Los
Angeles Catholic Worker, No. CV-14-7344 PSG.  
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determine whether a voluntary intention to abandon has been exhibited.224  If 
any reasonable doubt exists whether unattended property is abandoned, the 
property should be treated as unabandoned.225
Conclusion
The Fourth Amendment protects against both unreasonable searches 
and unreasonable seizures.226  It applies to seizures even if they are not the 
outcome of a search.227  An official “who happens to come across an 
individual’s property in a public area [can] seize it only if Fourth 
Amendment standards are satisfied . . .”228  A property seizure occurs when 
there is any meaningful interference with person’s possessory interests in 
that property.229  The Fourth Amendment therefore prohibits unreasonable 
interference with the possessions and belongings of homeless persons,230
because “the property of homeless individuals is due no less protection under 
the fourth amendment than that of the rest of society.”231
The Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to seizures of abandoned 
property.232  This does not mean that property momentarily left on a public 
sidewalk can be summarily seized and destroyed.233  The Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held in Lavan v. City of Los Angeles that a homeless person 
retains a protected property right in the person’s unattended belongings 
unless they have been abandoned.234  The modern abandonment test focuses 
upon whether a person has relinquished a reasonable expectation of privacy 
 224.  Cf. Lavan, 2014 WL 12693524, at *8–9 (considering abandonment under a Katz based 
test); Kincaid v. City of Fresno, No. 1:06-cv-1445 OWW SMS, 2006 WL 3542732, at *37 (E.D. 
Cal. Dec. 8, 2006) (considering abandonment under a test based on property law); Pottinger, 810 
F. Supp. at 1571–72 (applying a Katz based test), remanded for limited purposes, 40 F.3d 1155 
(11th Cir.1994), and directed to undertake settlement discussions, 76 F.3d 1154 (1996). 
 225.  Cf. Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0077RSM, 2017 WL 4410029, at *9 (W.D. Wash. 
Oct. 4, 2017) (upholding policies giving officials a degree of discretion but stressing that the 
policies required that “[a]ny doubts regarding the classification of an item are to be resolved in 
favor of treating the item as personal property.”). 
 226.  See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 227.  Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 68 (1992). 
 228.  Id.
 229.  See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.  
 230.  Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 231.  Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1992), remanded for 
limited purposes, 40 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir.1994), and directed to undertake settlement discussions,
76 F.3d 1154 (1996); see also Recchia v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Animal Svcs., 889 F.3d 553, 
558 (9th Cir. 2018); Cobine v. City of Eureka, 250 F. Supp. 3d 423, 434–35 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 232.  See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 
57, 58 (1964). 
 233.  Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1029. 
 234.  Id. at 1031–32. 
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in the property at the time of its seizure.235  However, the court in Lavan held 
that a person “need not show a reasonable expectation of privacy to enjoy 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment against seizures of their 
unabandoned property.”236  The modern abandonment test therefore does not 
squarely address abandonment for seizures not involving searches, because 
“it is possible for a person to retain a property interest in an item, but 
nonetheless to relinquish his or her reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
object.”237
The modern abandonment test is based upon a two-part rubric proposed 
in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States.238  When applied to 
decide whether property belonging to homeless persons has been abandoned, 
it looks at “first, whether the individual has a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the belongings; and second, whether that expectation is one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”239  It may be argued, based 
on more recent Supreme Court opinions that depart from Katz, that a 
property rights approach should be utilized in situations involving seizures 
to determine abandonment issues.240  A property law based approach would 
however only address subjective intent to abandon.241  A retreat to strict 
property law principles would be at odds with the Supreme Court’s repeated 
repudiation of “the notion that ‘arcane distinctions developed in property and 
tort law’ ought to control [ ] Fourth Amendment inquiry.”242
Abandonment issues involving homeless persons’ property should 
instead be evaluated using a modified version of the Katz framework; 
namely: (1) has someone “exhibited an actual (subjective)” possessory 
interest in property left unattended, and (2) is that interest “one that society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”243  Inquiry under a modified Katz-
based test would focus “on whether, through words, acts or other objective 
indications, a person has relinquished a reasonable expectation of [a 
 235.  Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-2874 PSG (AJWx), 2014 WL 12693524, at *8 
(C.D. Cal. July 24, 2014); Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 
2011), aff’d on other grounds 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1570–71. 
 236.  Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027–28. 
 237.  United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 238.  See e.g., United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 902 (9th Cir. 1972); see generally Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 239.  Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1571; see also Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96-C-0396, 1998 
WL 60804, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 1998). 
 240.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–11 (2012). 
 241.  See Katsaris v. United States, 684 F.2d 758, 761–63 (1982). 
 242.  United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91–93 (1980) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 143 (1978)); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 
(1960).
 243.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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possessory interest in unattended] property at the time of [its] seizure.”244
The determination would be made using an objective standard considering a 
totality of the circumstances known to officials at the time of seizure.245  A 
modified test would remain aligned closely enough to the original 
framework that resort could still be made with respect to procedural matters 
to abandonment cases decided under the Katz rubric.246
Homelessness is a national epidemic.  On a given night in 2018, 
194,467 homeless persons were staying in locations without shelter in the 
United States.247  They suffer from “exposure to the elements, insect and 
rodent bites, and the absence of sanitary facilities for sleeping, bathing or 
cooking[,]” and rarely choose to live in such conditions.248  There are 
legitimate reasons for local authorities to keep areas clean where homeless 
persons congregate, because noxious conditions can quickly develop that 
“present a health hazard to the general public, as well as to the homeless 
individuals in the area.”249
Cleanup activities are important.  The Orange County Register reported 
in 2018 that a cleanup along the Santa Ana River Trail in Anaheim, 
California yielded 404 tons of debris, including 13,950 needles, and 5,279 
pounds of hazardous waste (human waste, propane, pesticides, etc.).250
However, local authorities must “balance the right of people living 
unsheltered with the [ ] responsibility to maintain public health and 
safety.”251  It is sometimes difficult to differentiate between abandoned 
property and unabandoned property during cleanup efforts.252  Authorities 
should therefore err on the side of characterizing usable personal property as 
unabandoned if they are unsure whether something is abandoned, because 
 244.  Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting 
United States v. Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986)), aff’d 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 
2012).
 245.  United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 246.  See generally id. at 836–37 (summarizing the procedure used under Katz to determine 
whether something has been abandoned). 
 247.  MEGHAN HENRY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. HOUSING & URB. DEV. OFF. OF COMMUNITY PLAN.
& DEV., THE 2018 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS 10 (2018). 
 248.  Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992), remanded for 
limited purposes, 40 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir.1994), and directed to undertake settlement discussions,
76 F.3d 1154 (1996). 
 249.  Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96-C-0396, 1996 WL 627614, at *3, ¶ 8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 
1996).
 250.  Theresa Walker, Cleaning up a wasteland of epic proportions, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Mar. 10–11, 2018, at A3. 
 251.  Davila, supra note 8, at A6 (quote attributed to the City of Seattle Mayor’s Office). 
 252.  Cf. Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 863 (N.D. Cal. 1994) 
(acknowledging San Francisco’s argument that it is difficult to distinguish between abandoned and 
unabandoned property). 
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“the loss of items such as clothes and medicine threatens the already 
precarious existence of homeless individuals by posing health and safety 
hazards; additionally, the prospect of such losses may discourage them from 
leaving the parks and other areas to seek work, food or medical attention.”253
Well intended premature disposal of a usable unabandoned item only 
worsens the plight of the homeless person deprived of its use and perpetuates 
the public health and safety problem that a cleanup effort seeks to alleviate. 
 253.  Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1573.  
